The last two comments about German & Hebrew as national languages of the USA remind me that when I was a T.A. in European History & later when I taught "Western Civ" I used to talk in class about the extravagances of the French Revolution, such as denominating Notre Dame as the Temple of Reason & reworking the calendar, implying if not stating to the students that these efforts were so ahistorical that they were doomed. But I never discussed the American Revolution in the same way---which makes me now think that I had taken things like loyalty oaths, weak upper councils or governors, the idea that people can be virtuous, etc. for granted, i.e., had naturalized them, taken them as appropriate but perhaps failed parts of the Revolution. But maybe taking a loyalty oath is on a par with renaming the days, or thinking that an individual can be virtuous in the republican sense is on a par with switching a gothic cathedral to a temple of reason or thinking that Hebrew could be the national language of the USA. Has anybody written about the American Revolution in such a way as to think about its ideas & rituals as eccentric? Do we take it all so for granted that it seems natural to us? John Saillant
I'm intrigued by John Saillant's comments on the "excesses" of the French Revolution, as opposed to the supposed moderation of our own. I've thought for a while that the French Revolution was the worst thing that ever happened for the concept of revolution, not because it was bad in itself but because the template it supposedly offers has become a procrusean bed in regard to all others. Crane Brinton's old book _The Anatomy of Revolution_ is one example, but it's not the only one. I recall reading about 1920s Russians waiting for Thermidor and wondering who would play Bonaparte, not realizing that it would be the little guy with the mustache from Georgia. So too for the American Revolution. I keep insisting to my students that the French Revolution hadn't happened then, so there is no real point in forced comparison. It was an eighteenth-century Revolution (which means that the revolutionaries were not and could not have been Leninists, with their eyes firmly on what was to be done to get rid of the old order) and a western hemisphere revolution (which means that it didn't happen in Europe, that political separation from a European power was one of its major consequences, and that non-Europeans, non-white people were heavily involved).
Yet John's comment is intriguing. I'd go in a somewhat different direction. So many people are still hung up on the Edmund Burke/ Friedrich Gentz/John Quincy Adams of a "good" (because conservative) American Revolution versus a "bad" (because rationalizing and innovatory) French Revolution. Examples might be the continuation for the most part of Anglo-Colonial law versus the Code Napoleon, the retention of imperial measures as opposed to the creation of the metric system, and the brief French attempt at a revolutionary calendar.
Yet if we think about the trans-appalachian west for more than a moment we see an absolutely massive act of successful rationalization in the form of the territorial/state system combined with the Jeffersonian land grid. It won't do to say this was imposed on empty space. We've learned too much about how organized all that space had been during the colonial period, in economic, military, diplomatic, demographic, and cultural terms. Both politically and economically, what Congress did between 1784 and 1787 completely reset the terms on which people beyond the mountains would belong to and take part in what was now the dominant social order. How much more disruptive, radical, and innovatory an action could be imagined?
Unlike the Goddess of Reason in Notre Dame or the revolutionary calendar it took. But so did the Code Napoleon.
Edward Countryman
Clements Department of History
Southern Methodist University
John's question reminds of something readers of this list might want to know:
The fact that French Revolution historians have taken the ritual aspects of Revolutionary activity so seriously is because they have, since Tocqueville,
faced the difficult problem that the Revolution resulted not in liberte, egalite and fraternite, but rather in Napoleonic despotism and then a restoration of the monarch in 1815. For Tocqueville, the only thing that really changed with the revolution was that somebody--it's never clear who--began to think that social equality was possible. People began to act like equality was possible, and was their right. There was, in short, a change of mentalite. The question historians like Lynn Hunt, Mona Ozouf, Keith Baker, et al have been asking themselves is, how did the various rituals of revolution serve to reinforce this new sense? How did this abstract notion of social equality become a part of ordinary political culture?
The person who first raised these questions and the person who urged historians to take a new look at Tocqueville was the late Francois Furet, who died this summer near Paris. Cultural history as we know it would not exist were it not for Furet's pioneering essays(collected in INTERPRETING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION--1981), and his courageous rejection of the dogmatic and entrenched variety of Marxism that had dominated French Revolution historiography in post-War France.
Best,
Ed Gray
At 12:46 PM 8/8/97 +0000, you wrote:
>The last two comments about German & Hebrew as national languages
of
>the USA remind me that when I was a T.A. in European History &
later
>when I taught "Western Civ" I used to talk in class about the
>extravagances of the French Revolution, such as denominating Notre
>Dame as the Temple of Reason & reworking the calendar, implying if
not
>stating to the students that these efforts were so ahistorical
that
>they were doomed. But I never discussed the American Revolution in
the
>same way---which makes me now think that I had taken things like
>loyalty oaths, weak upper councils or governors, the idea that
people
>can be virtuous, etc. for granted, i.e., had naturalized them,
taken
>them as appropriate but perhaps failed parts of the Revolution.
But
>maybe taking a loyalty oath is on a par with renaming the days, or
>thinking that an individual can be virtuous in the republican sense
is
>on a par with switching a gothic cathedral to a temple of reason
or
>thinking that Hebrew could be the national language of the USA.
Has
>anybody written about the American Revolution in such a way as to
>think about its ideas & rituals as eccentric? Do we take it all so
for
>granted that it seems natural to us? John Saillant
I'm not sure what you mean by "ecentric," but you might begin with Edmund S. Morgan's essay "The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution," in the WMQ, (Jan. 1967): 3-43 followed by Peter Shaw's, _American Patriots and the Rituals of Revolution_ (1981); Alfred Young's work deals with these issues also.
E. Wayne Carp
On Fri, 8 Aug 1997, John Saillant wrote:
> The last two comments about German & Hebrew as national languages
of
> the USA remind me that when I was a T.A. in European History &
later
> when I taught "Western Civ" I used to talk in class about the
> extravagances of the French Revolution, such as denominating
Notre
> Dame as the Temple of Reason & reworking the calendar, implying
if not
> stating to the students that these efforts were so ahistorical
that
> they were doomed. But I never discussed the American Revolution in
the
> same way---which makes me now think that I had taken things like
> loyalty oaths, weak upper councils or governors, the idea that
people
> can be virtuous, etc. for granted, i.e., had naturalized them,
taken
> them as appropriate but perhaps failed parts of the Revolution.
But
> maybe taking a loyalty oath is on a par with renaming the days,
or
> thinking that an individual can be virtuous in the republican sense
is
> on a par with switching a gothic cathedral to a temple of reason
or
> thinking that Hebrew could be the national language of the USA.
Has
> anybody written about the American Revolution in such a way as to
> think about its ideas & rituals as eccentric? Do we take it all
so for
> granted that it seems natural to us? John Saillant
Professors Saillant and Countryman are raising important, if oft discussed, matters about Revolution in the early modern world. I have long thought that the radicalism of the American Revolution has been understated, if not in its origins, then certainly in its consequences. Countryman's example of the Land Ordinances of 1780s is a good one. I also think that Paine's version of republicanism has been too neglected, despite Foner's work on it. That the radicalism of the Americans were largely rooted in the convoluted English and Scots experience of the 17th century does not seem to me to make the
Americans "conservative." The radicalism of Algernon Sidney and Locke, while differing in nuance, was truly "innovative" in the context of early modern political theory and practice.
Richard P. Gildrie
Austin Peay State University
gildrier@apsu01.apsu.edu
Professor Gildrie might find Bernard Bailyn's _The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution_ useful here. The most important book on the Revolution (whether you disagree with what he says or not), almost half of it is devoted to the unintended radical consequences of the Revolution. It's not that the radicalism of the American Revolution has been overlooked, rather the issue is where it is located. Bailyn locates in the realm of ideas after 1776 -- freedom and equality spilling over into areas never intended by the revolutionaries. Neo-progresives like Nash and Countrymen (at least in their published works) want to read back 20th century identity politics into the 18th century and locate radicalism before 1776 in volitional mobilization and consciousness raising of blacks, women, urban artisans, etc. Its an old, but crucial, issue in Revolutionary historiography.
E. Wayne Carp
Pacific Lutheran University
On Mon, 11 Aug 1997, Richard Gildrie, H-Tennessee wrote:
> Professors Saillant and Countryman are raising important, if oft
> discussed, matters about Revolution in the early modern world. I
have
> long thought that the radicalism of the American Revolution has
been
> understated, if not in its origins, then certainly in its
consequences.
> Countryman's example of the Land Ordinances of 1780s is a good
one.
> I also think that Paine's version of republicanism has been too
> neglected, despite Foner's work on it. That the radicalism of the
> Americans were largely rooted in the convoluted English and Scots
> experience of the 17th century does not seem to me to make the
> Americans "conservative." The radicalism of Algernon Sidney and
> Locke, while differing in nuance, was truly "innovative" in the
> context of early modern political theory and practice.
> Richard P. Gildrie
> Austin Peay State University
> gildrier@apsu01.apsu.edu
I've been reading quietly, and I'm struck by one thing left out of the discussion so far. American national identity, and American nationalism, were first and foremost political constructs, and as a result it does not surprise me at all that there were gropings, spurred and shaped by political considerations, to new-fashion other components of American national identity and nationalism. That's why, for me at least, such efforts seem no surprise nor in any way eccentric or "wacko." Didn't Ann Fairfax Withington do a fine book for Oxford in 1992 on just such matters as these? As I recall, her study focused on the Continental Congress's efforts to establish such things as sumptuary regulations and to prohibit theatre-going, cockfighting, and other amusements and distractions that would sap American virtue and distract the citizenry from the great contest with the mother country.
Richard B. Bernstein
Adjunct Professor, New York Law School
Daniel M. Lyons Visiting Professor in American History, Brooklyn College
(1997-1998)
Assistant Book Review Editor for Constitutional History, H-Law
<rbernstein@nyls.edu>
John Saillant's question from earlier this week raises many interesting points. Sometimes we historians tend to forget how contested the Revolution was at the local level. Professor Saillant points out that he may have naturalized loyalty oaths, or as he says taken them as appropriate but "perhaps failed parts of the Revolution." I am sure that he remembers that Patriots and the British used these oaths because people signed them, and because people did not sign them. Not signing a loyalty oath, or signing one, proved a fairly good way to determine which side someone favored, but lots of people did not sign them who did not become loyalists. Sung Bok Kim's recent article in the JAH illustrates how the Revolution was a civil war, and how many rural people, at least, chose to remain as neutral as possible. Jonathon Clark's essay on Poughkeepsie, New York in Hall and Murrin, eds., Saints and Revolutionaries demonstrates some of these same arguments. These people did not all think the Patriots too "radical." Many thought the Patriots too conservative. They often differed over their interpretations of property, which is why the land actions in the the western territories in the 1780s remain important. While I am not sure that I completely agree with Richard P. Gildrie, who said that Locke was "truly innovative" (see the essay by G.E. Aylmer on property in 17th century England in a 1980 Past and Present), people held specific and sometimes conflicting interpretations of property and what constituted land ownership. Alan Taylor has shown that in Maine, and Brendan McConville will show that for New Jersey. Radical and conservative depended on which side one sat.
That idea may be applied to several key themes we write about when we look at the Revolution. Independence, liberty, happiness (or property as Jefferson first wrote, borrowing from Locke), took on conflicting meanings for Ethan Allen and New York landlords who became Patriots, for instance. Allen thought the Declaration of Independence allowed him to declare Vermont's independence from New York. New York's Provincial Congress and the Continental Congress did not see it quite the same way. Again, Taylor and Michael Bellesiles show how people differed in their interpretations of the Revolution. These are not the only people who have done so, but the list is long and include historians such as Alfred Young and Jesse Lemisch. The subjects we study infused these ideas into long-held beliefs in drastically different ways, changing them to fit their needs and infusing them with their perceptions of a what comprised a good economic and political society. Some of these ideas and activities seemed eccentric, and sometimes harmful, to them. Which were good and which were problematic probably depends on whom one studies.
Tom Humphrey
Northern Illinois University
Professor Carp's response to my comments on radicalism in the revolution
encourage me to attempt a clarification in hope of furthering
consideration of the problem.
Professor Carp is correct about the Bailyn now classic
Ideological Origins and I believe that there is something approaching a
consensus on the general point that the American Revolution had truly
revolutionary, if unintended, consequences.
The problem is in the origins of the revolution itself, as
Professor Carp notes. I believe that that "radicalism" of the late
17th and 18th centuries in England and America has been greatly
underestimated. One symptom is the tendency to claim that Thomas
Paine's writings were somehow marginal (Irving Kristol, Pauline Maier).
What is essential, it seems to me, is to recognize the complexity of
18th ideological discourse and recover it. My sense is that it is
indeed "radical" in parts within the context of the era.
R.P. Gildrie
Austin Peay State University
gildrier@aapsu01.apsu.edu
This is a very interesting discussion, but some of it seems to me to have an archaic flavor, reminding me of the state of the field when I came to it some forty years ago. After great advances in social history, there seems now to be some backsliding, back to the notion of the Revolution as an event in intellectual history. Thus, questions about the radicalism or otherwise of the Revolution are sometimes discussed here in terms of great ideas and great writers, and we're back to those old chestnuts about English political thinkers. Folks, you don't have radicalism without popular activity, agency, leadership. Some of the magnificent work in progress by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, offering a kind of a Palmer "from the bottom up," has been published in articles. We are talking about an international movement in which radical ideas travel around the Atlantic in the heads of largely illiterate people, and in their behavior. See the work of Al Young, and others, and see also, as Mary Schweitzer is kind enough to mention, my Jack Tar vs John Bull, just published -- as well as my other articles.
The national tendency to assume that the civil rights movemeent of the 1960's sprang from the head of Martin Luther King offers a relevant contemporary parallel. Certainly these ideas are important, and play a causal role. But it seems, excuse the expression, kind of '50's to be looking at revolutions with only secondary attention to those who make them.
Jesse Lemisch
Wayne Carp, alas, falls into the standard trap of pigeon-holing somebody (in this case Gary Nash and myself) and then effectively dismissing them. I don't dispute hishigh valuation on Bud Bailyn's IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS. I still teach from it, and I relied on it for significant parts of my 1985 synthesis. But for heaven's sakes, it was a starting point, not Scripture. From it, and other 1960s work there emerged a two-decade cycle of scholarship that explored the Revolution's revolutionary qualities. Is it reading modern "identity politics" into another epoch to simply take seriously what evidence from the epoch seems to say? Or (picking up on Mary's theme about being citizens and scholars), is it legitimate to probe the Revolution for a better understanding of Americans' strong and historically-developed ability to have both a shared identity and many specific identities. Hopefully, David Waldstreicher's forthcoming book (OIEAHC, this autumn) will bring us to some greater sophistication on this. Schweitzer invites us to think about some serious questions and to be open about it. It's a huge mistake to take the French Revolution as some sort of template to which all others must to some degree conform. It's an equally huge mistake to read back the 20th century Leninist notion about the importance of disciplined professional revolutionaries with their eyes on a definite prize into an eighteenth-century situation in which people were making it up as they went along. It's the biggest mistake of all, I think, to fail to see that we are studying a set of American events, not Europeans ones, a point that I pleaded in WMQ in April, 1996.
After a quarter century of studying the Revolution, I'm still amazed by it, and prepared to be surprised by it. Effectively, the topic went dead about the middle of the 1980s. The recent interest in the Revolution's significance for subsequent development (Wood's RADICALISM, Young's anthology BEYOND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, my WMQ piece and AMERICANS) has only partly revived it. Schweitzer invites us to return to the topic head-on and offers both some ideas as to how to do so and an attitude that deserves emulation. Brava!
Edward Countryman
Clements Department of History
Southern Methodist University
> What is essential, it seems to me, is to recognize the complexity
of
> 18th ideological discourse and recover it. My sense is that it is
> indeed "radical" in parts within the context of the era.
> R.P. Gildrie
> Austin Peay State University
> gildrier@aapsu01.apsu.edu
True enough. But instead of using quoatation marks which merely indicate
the existence of a problem, could you define for us what you mean by
"radical"? That would help.
-Dave WIlliams gmu
Mr. Lemisch's point is well taken, in part. It seems to me our problem is no longer an either "great ideas" or "popular activity, agency, leadership." Our problem is to connect these vast networks of thought and action, to reconstruct the milieu that shaped the revolution.
Richard P. Gildrie
Mr. Williams asks a pertinent question. What is "radical"? I will try to define it. In the old sense of cutting to the root. It means asking fundamental questions about how and why social and political practices take the form they do and imagining alternatives. In the 17th and 18th century, there were "elitist" thinkers and popular writers and agitators who were doing this "radical" work. I, frankly, do not care a whit whether the historians who are trying to reconstruct this discourse and milieu are modern conservatives or "neo-progressives." Richard P. Gildrie